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Abst rac t - -A  cryptosystem which can securely broadcast ecret messages in a public access dis- 
tributed system is proposed. Comparing with the existing broadcasting schemes, this scheme always 
requires fewer broadcasting messages. Furthermore, when a new user is inserted into the distributed 
system, the corresponding secret and public keys can be determined without changing any existing 
keys. © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Due to the fast progress of computer communication etworks and popularity of distributed 
processing systems, sharing of remote expensive resources becomes a reality. However, sharing 
makes it quite difficult for ensuring that unauthorized persons do not have access to either 
information stored in the system or messages during transmission over the network. All the 
methods before [1-3] need a large amount of broadcasting messages and have great difficulty in 
handling new users. In this paper, a cryptosystem to overcome these problems is proposed. 
BROADCAST ING SCHEME 
Since this proposed scheme is based on the RSA public key scheme [4] and a conventional 
cryptosystem such as DES [5], their schemes are introduced first. With the RSA scheme, there 
exist two keys, d and e, that work in pairs for decryption and encryption, respectively. The 
starting point in finding keys for this scheme is to select a secret pair (p, q) of large prime numbers, 
and make m = p.q public. Besides, the Euler ~(m) = (p -  1). (q -  1), and let a small odd integer e 
be chosen so that e is relatively prime to ~(m).  Then, select d such that e • d - i rood ~(m). A 
plaintext message M is encrypted to ciphertext C by C = M e modm,  and then the plaintext 
is recovered by M = C ~ mod m. Because of symmetry in modular arithmetic, encryption and 
decryption are mutual inverse and commutative. Therefore, M = C d rood ra = (Me) d mod m. In 
this paper, in order to ensure the security of our scheme, we modify the RSA public key scheme. 
Let p = 2p t + 1 and q = 2q~+ = 1 where pt, q~ are primes. Define A(m) = lcm(p - 1, q - 1) and 
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select d such that e • d - I rood ~(A(m)). On the other hand, with the DES scheme, a master 
key MK is used as the encryption/decryption key.Therefore, M = DMK(EMK(/~)),  where E(.) 
and D(.) denote the enciphering function and deciphering function, respectively. 
Consider a distributed system consisting of n users denoted by UI, U2, • •., Un. In the network, 
all users can directly communicate with each other, that is, the network is fully connected in the 
way that two users can directly communicate with each other. Besides, it is assumed that there 
is a central authority server (CAS for short) in the distributed system. 
Initially, the CAS assigns user Ui of the distributed system two secret keys ti and Ki, and a 
public key f ( t i ) .  Assume that all the secret keys are known only to the CAS and user Ui. Besides, 
all the keys are constructed as follows: 
t i=P i ,  f ( t i )=t~,  and K i=K~'modm,  
where Pi is a prime number, and K0 is a secret key possessed by the CAS. 
In this scheme, assume P1, P2,.-., Ph are h distinct primes, where h is large enough to use in 
our assignment. In the following, a secure a broadcasting mechanism for distributed systems is 
presented. This scheme ssentially consists of two phases. 
1. In the first phase, the CAS constructs two public keys f (B i )  and PKi for sender Ui. 
2. In the second phase, Ui decrypts the master secret key MKi and then broadcasts the 
ciphertext C. 
Without loss of generality, let U1 be the sender, U2, U3,..., Ua be the legitimate recipients, 
and Ua+l, Ua+2,..., Un be the illegitimate recipient. 
Phase 1: (Construct two public keys for the sender.) 
Step 1: (Broadcasting request from the sender.) UI tells the CAS that he wants to 
broadcast a message M to U2, U3,..., Ua. 
Step 2: (Construct two public keys f(B1) and PK1 by CAS.) 
B1 = t2 " t3 " . . . " ta, f (B1)  = B~, 
MK1 = Ko B1 modm, PK1 = E~I(MK1). 
Phase 2: (Compute the encryption key MK1 and broadcast the ciphertext C.) 
MK1 = Dtl(PK1), C -- EMKI(M). 
Note that, in our scheme, the encryption key e is secret and is possessed by the CAS. However, 
the decryption key d is public. The value f ( t j )  for each user Uj is public and can be used to 
derive the key of the sender in the distributed broadcasting system. It turns out that the value 
( f (B i ) / f ( t j ) )amodA(m)  is equal Bi / t j  modA(m) if and only if Ui is the sender and Uj is the 
legitimate recipient. The following theorem establishes this fact. 
THEOREM 1. Let Ui and Uj be two users in a system. I f  Ui is the sender and Uj is the legitimate 
recipient, then ( f  ( B i ) /  f ( t j )  ) d mod A(m) = Bi/t~ mod A(m). 
PROOF. Since Ui is the sender and Uj is the legitimate recipient, let Bi = r . t j ,  where r = Bi/t3. 
Then, f ( t j )  = t~, and f (B i )  = B~ = (r . t3) e. Therefore, we have 
~)  modA(m) 
= r e'd mod A(m) 
= re.amod i(~(m)) rood A(m) 
= r mod A(m) 
= ~ modA(m). II 
r j  
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Therefore, the legitimate recipient U# can derive the secret key MKi  came from the sender U~ 
and then obtains the broadcasting message M by employing the following decryption phase. 
Decryption phase: (Reconstruct the encryption key MKi  and decrypt the broadcast mess- 
age M.) 
MKi = K0 B' rood m 
= (Ko~) Bdtj modm 
= (Kt~)B ' / t 'm°dX(m)modm 
= K! f (B i ) / f ( t j ) )a  mod A(rn) mod m 
--3 
= K~ l(B~)/l(tj))d modm 
U = DMK, (C). 
SECURITY  ANALYS IS  
The legitimate recipient Uj can drive the message M came from the sender Ui by using the 
decryption phase proposed above. However, it is infeasible to derive the secret key MK~ by only 
knowing the public keys of the sender Ui for any illegitimate recipient, because the security of our 
scheme is the same as the RSA public key scheme, which is strongly believed to be computationally 
difficult to attack. Moreover, this proposed scheme is secure on attacks by an intruder using the 
following approaches. 
1. Find the secret key MK: in this case, it is assumed that an illegitimate recipient is trying 
to evaluate the secret key MK. Since an intruder does not satisfy Theorem 1, he cannot 
employ the decryption phase mentioned above. 
2. Obtain the secret keys Ki and ti only known by user i: the intruder may come from those 
legitimate recipients, since there is no information available to compute the secret keys 
Ki and ti. Hence, this protocol also can protect he security of Ki and ti. 
From the above discussion, this proposed protocol is secure since it can prevent he secret keys 
MKi, Ki, and ti from being disclosed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A secure broadcasting mechanism in distributed systems has been proposed. It is ensured to 
prevent he attacks and effectively reduced the broadcasting messages generated by the sender, 
hence this scheme is feasible for brooxtcasting messages in a distributed system. Besides, no 
modification of the secret and public keys is necessary when a new user is inserted into the 
distributed system, or an existing user is removed from the system, which is needed by almost 
all past broadcasting schemes. 
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